CVE-2026-47065
CRITICAL 9.8ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy Assessment: Fully addressed. When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc() is dispatched. JDK then calls the default ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted classes list . ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes Assessment: Fully addressed. For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers Both issues have been fixed.
Severe if exploited (CVSS 9.8), but no known exploitation and low modeled probability. Patch on a normal cadence.
Exploitation likelihood
0.5%chance of exploitation in 30 days · 37th percentile
Impact if exploited
9.8CVSS 3.1 · CRITICAL
- ConfidentialityHigh
- IntegrityHigh
- AvailabilityHigh
What an attacker needs
- ✓Access: Reachable over the network — no local access needed
- ✓Privileges: No account or privileges required
- ✓User interaction: No user interaction needed
- ✓Complexity: No special conditions — reliably repeatable
✓ lowers the bar for an attacker · ⚠ raises it
Weakness (CWE)
- CWE-502: Deserialization of untrusted data
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H