CVE-2026-55962
MEDIUM 6TLS 1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA) issue where a server could accept a client's Finished message without the client having sent a Certificate and CertificateVerify. The post-handshake-auth exemption that allows an empty/absent peer certificate was only intended for the initial handshake, but it was also being applied while a post-handshake CertificateRequest was still outstanding. The check is now scoped to the initial handshake only: on the server, once a post-handshake CertificateRequest has been sent (certReqCtx is set), a peer certificate and a valid CertificateVerify are required again before the Finished is accepted, with empty-certificate handling following the configured verify mode (FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) just as during first-handshake client authentication. Only affects TLS 1.3 servers built with post-handshake authentication support (WOLFSSL_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH / --enable-postauth, included in --enable-all) that enable WOLFSSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE and request a client certificate after the handshake via wolfSSL_request_certificate(). Clients, and servers that do not use post-handshake authentication, are unaffected.
No known exploitation, public exploit, or elevated probability at this time. Track for changes.
Exploitation likelihood
0.1%chance of exploitation in 30 days · 4th percentile
Impact if exploited
6CVSS 4.0 · MEDIUM
- ConfidentialityNone
- IntegrityHigh
- AvailabilityNone
What an attacker needs
- ✓Access: Reachable over the network — no local access needed
- ⚠Privileges: Requires a low-privilege account
- ✓User interaction: No user interaction needed
- ✓Complexity: No special conditions — reliably repeatable
- ⚠Requirements: Specific conditions must be present
✓ lowers the bar for an attacker · ⚠ raises it
Weakness (CWE)
- CWE-287: Improper authentication
CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N